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sideration for their certificates, thought they were actually becoming
cestuis in a trust. However, by principles of equity, where the trust is set
aside, the certificate holders may be given a lien on the res which was
purchased with their money. The lien in this instance would give the
certificate holders a preference over general creditors as to the proceeds
of the res. A dictum from Seiger v. Seiger, 162 Minn. 322, 202 N.W.
742 (1925), advanced the point that, where a trustee wrongfully
invests money, the beneficiary may have a lien or a charge upon the res.
Lastly, it is remotely possible to apply the theory of marshalling
assets. According to the Ulmer case the creditors of the bank are
allowed to satisfy their claims from the general assets of the bank, and
from the trust res also. It would only seem equitable to require the
creditors of the bank to come against the general assets first, and leave
the res for the certificate holders, with whose money the res was pur-
chased. See McMahan v. Fetherstonhaugh, I I.R. 83 (1895).
By the above four solutions, the cestui is put in status quo to the
detriment of no other claimant. If Squire v. Central United National
Bank is carried to the Supreme Court the Ulmer case may be reaffirmed
in its sweeping nullification of the trust in the interest of general cred-
itors, or it may be limited, and a remedy adopted in the interest of the
certificate holders. It is a choice of policies.
SEYMOuR A. TREITELMAN
WORKMENS COMPENSATION
EXEMPTION OF AWARD FROM ATTACHMENT AFTER PAYMENT
TO INJURED EMPLOYEE
Plaintiff employee recovered an award under the provisions of the
Workmens' Compensation Act, and deposited it in a bank unmixed
with other funds. There it was attached by plaintiff's creditors for the
payment of pre-existing debts. Plaintiff petitioned the Common Pleas
Court of Stark County to have the funds declared exempt from execu-
tion. The court held that compensation was not exempt from attach-
ment and execution after payment in view of the express working of
Section 1465-88 Ohio General Code. Talaba v. luld, i 9 Abs. 676, 3
Ohio Op. 556, affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion in
4 Ohio Op. 252 (I935).
The pertinent part of Section 1465-88 of the Ohio General Code
provides that "Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all
claims of creditors and from any attachment or execution, and shall be
paid only to such employees or their dependents."
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It is settled that no property is exempt from seizure for debts unless
it has been made so by statute. Chandler v. Home, 23 Ohio App. 1,
154 N.E. 748, 5 Abs. 3 (1926). Owing to dissimilarity of statutes,
the decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions on the problem involved
in the principal case have not been uniform. Construing a Texas statute
providing that "all compensation allowed . . . shall be exempt," etc.,
the courts of that state have held compensation exempt from execution
both before and after payment to the injured employee. Gaddy v. First
Nat. Bank of Beaumont, 115 Tex. 393, 283 S.W. 472 (1926). Like-
wise, under a statute providing that "compensaton or benefits due. . .
shall be exempt from all claims of creditors," the New York Court of
Appeals, speaking through Chief Justice Cardozo in Surace v. Danna,
248 N.Y. 18, i61 N.E. 315 (1928), held that compensation continues
to be exempt after deposit to the employee's credit in a trust company.
These New York and Texas decisions were based on the ground that
the award represents a maintenance fund for the injured employee
during periods of disability and to permit the money to be taken by cred-
itors as soon as it reaches the employee would effectually thwart this
desirable social policy. But under a statute reading, "claims or payments
due ... shall be exempt," it was held in Hawthorn v. Davis, 140 So.
56 (La. 1932), that the award was exempt only before payment on the
ground that such was the manifest intent of the legislature. This was
also the view taken in Wartella v. Osick, io8 Pa. Super. 589, i65 A.
66o (933), where the statute exempted "claims for payments due."
Closely analogous to the statute involved in the instant case is the
section of the federal pension law dealing with the exemption of war
veterans' pensions from the claims of creditors. 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54
(Repealed Aug. 12, 1935, C. 5io, Sec. 3, 49 Stat. 609) provided that
any sum of money "due or to become due" shall be exempt, "whether
the same remains with the Pension Office, or any officer or agent there-
of, or is in course of transmission to the pensioner entitled thereto." It
has been uniformly held that by necessary implication from the explicit
wording of this act, pension money is not exempt after it has reached the
pensioner. Fulwiler v. Infield, 6 O.C.C. 36, 3 O.C.D. 338 (89);
affirmed without opinion in Wilson v. Fulwiler, 52 Ohio St. 623
(1894); McIntosh v. A4ubrey, I85 U.S. 122, 22 S.C. 561 (i9Ol).
However, under a federal statute, 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 618, which pro-
vides that "no sum payable to a veteran . .. , no adjfisted service certifi-
cate, and no proceeds of any loan made on such certificate shall be sub-
ject to attachment," etc., it has been held that the proceeds of a loan
on an adjusted war service certificate are exempt from execution so long
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as the fund can reasonably be traced. Second Nat. Bank v. HToblit, 41
Ohio App. 126, 179 N.E. 812 (193i).
It is to be noted that the Ohio statute in question differs from those
quoted above in that it contains in clear language the qualification that
the award is to be exempt "before payment." Thus, it is not open to
the liberal construction that has been given the New York and Texas
Statutes. But, as was stated by the court, the statute does not effectuate
nor carry out the broad purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The act was designed to provide a means of livelihood for the injured
employee during disability and to prevent him from becoming a charge
on the public. These objects are to a great extent defeated if the funds
are subject to attachment immediately upon receipt by the disabled em-
ployee. For these reasons, in line with the court's suggestion, it is
desirable that the statute be amended so as to exempt from attachment
and execution compensation both before and after payment.
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